A Deeper Look at Evergreen Private Equity Relative to Traditional Drawdown
Humans are wired for comfort. Evolution favored those who sought shelter, warmth, food, and social bonds — instincts that boosted survival. But in an age of abundance, this once-helpful tendency may be working against us.
Psychology confirms this bias. We consistently favor short-term relief over long-term reward. Walter Mischel’s “marshmallow test”1 famously showed most children opted for one treat now rather than two later. A recent popular airport read, The Comfort Crisis2 argues that modern life is engineered to eliminate friction — in how we eat, move, and even handle boredom. Yet despite all these comforts, we’re often more anxious, distracted, and physically unwell than ever.
Comfort, it turns out, may carry a cost: it can dull performance and weaken resilience and undermine results.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in fitness. Effective workouts are uncomfortable, but some pain signals adaptation. Gimmicks like the vibrating belt machines of the 1950s — promising fat loss via passive jiggling — sold well but delivered nothing. They were marketed as a more “comfortable” alternative to actual exercise – unsurprisingly, they didn’t work as intended.
We see a potentially similar pattern emerging in private equity.
The Allure of Comfortable Private Equity
Evergreen private equity funds are gaining momentum. A number of well-known investment firms are introducing new vehicles, and advisors are embracing them. These structures promise simplicity: immediate investment, no capital calls, 1099 tax forms, quarterly liquidity, and access for a broader investor base.
But that’s precisely the issue.
Historically, private equity in traditional drawdown vehicles has outperformed public equity by several hundred basis points annually, compounding into a substantial long-term advantage.3 That’s a meaningful gap widened by disciplined, illiquidity-enabled execution.
Private equity, at its core, has long required some elements of discomfort in pursuit of excellent results: illiquidity, lockups, capital calls, and the discipline to wait. These “frictions” weren’t flaws—they were features. They created space for value creation and aligned incentives around long-term results.
In our view, Evergreen funds seek to make private equity more like public equity — liquid, clean, and convenient. But this comfort-first model can dilute the elements that make private equity effective.
This paper explores the tradeoffs behind that shift. Evergreen funds may be easier to use — but easier doesn’t mean better. Like those vintage vibrating belts, their appeal may reflect what feels good more than what truly works.
For advisors, the appeal of Evergreen funds is obvious:
- Immediate investment = No multi-year ramp-up
- Single allocation = No need to build portfolios of drawdown funds
- Optional liquidity = Quarterly redemptions, typically with 5% gates
- No capital calls = “Set it and forget it”
- 1099 tax reporting = “No more K-1s”
- Broader investor eligibility = Including non-Qualified Purchasers
These attributes reduce complexity for advisors and investors. But the structure introduces tradeoffs, many of which are underdiscussed. We believe evergreen designs can narrow the investment universe, distort manager incentives, obscure performance clarity, and potentially create valuation and liquidity mismatches.
Evergreen funds are not inherently flawed. Many serve real purposes — as complements to drawdown portfolios, bridges during fundraising, or entry points for new investors. Thoughtfully built evergreen funds can serve a purpose — but we believe they shouldn’t be the centerpiece.
We explore eight key concerns, grouped into four themes, where evergreen structures merit deeper scrutiny:
Theme 1 | Strategy Dilution and Access Erosion: A Narrower Slice of Private Equity
- Strategy purity – do holdings reflect true private equity or a narrower subset?
- Manager access – are investors gaining access to top-tier managers?
Theme 2 | Distorted Incentives: Deployment Pressure and Early Performance
- Incentive structures – are managers pressured to deploy too quickly?
- Performance visibility – are early gains reliable or inflated by accounting optics?
- Fee mechanics – are fees aligned with long-term outcomes?
Theme 3 | Valuation and Liquidity: A Fragile Illusion
- Valuation precision – How accurate are NAVs in illiquid markets?
- Liquidity mismatch – can redemptions truly be honored during market stress?
Theme 4 | Apples to Oranges: Misleading Comparisons
- Are evergreen funds being fairly compared to drawdown structures when it comes to performance?
Not all products are equally affected by these, as some evergreen funds are better constructed than others. But these issues are common — and material — enough to merit real caution in our view.
Before comfort becomes the guiding principle of private equity fund design, the industry should pause and ask: what are we sacrificing for simplicity?
Theme 1 | Strategy Dilution and Access Erosion: A Narrower Slice of Private Equity
Evergreen funds aim to “democratize” access to private equity. But beneath the surface, they often offer a narrower, and arguably less compelling, slice of the private equity landscape.
Many evergreen funds avoid primary commitments in early-stage, high-growth, and longer-duration strategies—not due to investment views, but because the liquidity structure can’t support them. This liquidity mismatch is well documented: semi-liquid evergreen vehicles must routinely meet redemption requests (typically quarterly limits of ~2.5–5% of NAV), which constrains their ability to commit capital to long-duration private equity deals4. That’s a meaningful tradeoff. Primary fund commitments, which represent the majority of global private equity deal flow and where top-tier alpha is most concentrated, are especially difficult to access through evergreen structures. In their place, evergreen funds often lean heavily on secondaries, co-investments, and semi-liquid credit. These strategies align better with the continuous inflows and periodic liquidity demands of the evergreen model. While secondaries can be smart tactical tools, they typically deliver lower dispersion than primary funds and often anchor evergreen
portfolios by necessity rather than design5.
Compounding the issue is broader portfolio dilution. To meet liquidity requirements, many evergreen funds include meaningful allocations to private credit, public equities, or even cash. These elements further erode the purity of the private equity experience and may reduce the long-term return potential investors are seeking.
Manager access also tends to suffer.
While evergreen funds often feature well-known sponsors, they rarely provide exposure to top-tier performers. Top-tier managers, often oversubscribed, don’t typically accept evergreen constraints like quarterly pricing or forced liquidity. As Morgan Stanley recently noted, many of the best-performing GPs “explicitly avoid” these structures due to philosophical misalignment5.
Convenience may be expanding technical access, but often at the cost of quality exposure. What’s missing from the portfolio may matter more than what’s included.
For investors considering evergreen private equity structures, it is also worth emphasizing that asset selection and the potential for sustainable long-term returns may be stronger in strategies that prioritize direct investments. In our view, direct-focused approaches offer greater control over portfolio construction, deeper alignment with value creation, and improved selectivity. These advantages can be harder to fully capture in other types of evergreen formats. In addition, we suggest that evergreen strategies could benefit from lowering secondary exposure and instead emphasizing high-conviction primaries and co-investments. Achieving this may require sacrificing some liquidity, for example by shifting from quarterly to annual, but we believe the tradeoff could be worthwhile given the potential for stronger returns. This reinforces our belief that a thoughtfully designed evergreen structure can be especially effective in maximizing long-term value.
Theme 2 | Distorted Incentives: Deployment Pressure and Early Performance
One of traditional private equity’s greatest strengths is the flexibility it affords managers: to be patient, opportunistic, and selective. The drawdown model gives them time — to raise capital, deploy thoughtfully, build value, and exit strategically. That timeline isn’t just a structural detail; it’s a core driver of long-term outperformance.
Evergreen structures compress that timeline — and quietly reshape incentives in ways that may undermine investment discipline.
At the heart of this is deployment pressure. In a drawdown fund, capital is called gradually over years, aligned with opportunity. In an evergreen fund, inflows are continuous — and like all open-ended funds every new dollar drags on returns until deployed. Uninvested cash becomes a performance blemish, pushing managers to put money to work quickly, often at the expense of selectivity.
That urgency can distort pricing discipline. In hot markets, when caution is most warranted, evergreen funds may feel compelled to chase deals merely to keep up with inflows. Market commentary has indicated that these vehicles sometimes pay premiums—on average around 4% above traditional secondary buyers—when acquiring LP stakes, not necessarily out of conviction but to absorb capital quickly6. The risk: managers become hammers looking for nails.
Somewhat ironically, this rapid deployment is often marketed as a benefit: “immediate investment.” But in private markets, immediacy isn’t usually an advantage. The ability to wait for potentially better vintages or stronger companies is a foundational feature of the strategy.
This pressure intersects with another design quirk: “optical” initial performance via secondary purchases.
To ramp exposure quickly, many evergreen funds rely on secondaries — buying existing fund interests at a discount. This can be smart. But it also creates a subtle accounting illusion. A fund that buys an asset at 80 cents on the dollar and marks it to 100 shows a 25% paper gain — instantly — without any fundamental change in value. These unrealized gains create strong early returns on paper for a new investor looking at the fund.
The result: eye-catching performance that may owe more to timing and markups than actual success. These assets might turn out great — but we won’t know until realized. Yet many evergreen funds charge performance fees on these unrealized gains — sometimes monthly or quarterly. Often, there’s no clawback or catch-up if values later decline. The result: managers get paid based on paper returns, even if outcomes disappoint. Investors who bought in at marked-up NAVs after the secondary deals can miss out on the performance bump.
By contrast, drawdown funds structure their incentives more conservatively. Capital is deployed deliberately, based on opportunity. Performance fees are tied to actual distributions — real dollars returned to investors — not accounting marks. Hurdles, clawbacks, and multi-year evaluation windows help to increase the likelihood managers win only when investors do.
Fees for evergreen structures are often more complex than they initially appear. It’s important for investors to understand how performance fees are calculated—whether there are catch-ups, if incentive fees are based on NAV, and how frequently fees are crystallized are all critical considerations. Additional layers, such as acquired fund fees (i.e., indirect costs from investments in other funds), leverage expenses, and potential redemption fees, further add to the complexity. These fees can be justified by strong investment performance, but when applied to average-performing portfolios, they prompt a necessary evaluation of whether the cost aligns with the quality of returns.
Theme 3 | Valuation and Liquidity: A Fragile Illusion
One of the most appealing promises of evergreen private equity funds is clarity — NAVs updated quarterly, redemption schedules suggesting public-market-like liquidity, and a sense of control over private equity exposure.
But this polish masks two fundamental issues: valuation imprecision and liquidity mismatch.
First, valuation.
In public markets, prices emerge from continuous trades — offering transparency, real-time discovery, and market-based accuracy. Evergreen private equity funds, by contrast, rely on internal or third-party estimates to determine NAV, typically updated quarterly. Valuations in private markets are typically model-based and informed by internal estimates or third-party appraisals. As a result, they often reflect inputs that trail public market volatility.
This lag is more than cosmetic. A company may stumble in March, but its NAV might not reflect that until June — if at all. In volatile markets, this delay becomes risky. Investors may buy in at inflated NAVs or redeem at depressed ones, making consequential decisions based on stale or distorted figures.
Regulators have taken notice. The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority and the U.S. SEC have flagged concerns about valuation methodologies in open-ended private market funds — especially when managers earn fees based on NAV7. Even with good intentions, there’s a natural incentive to lean optimistic — and given the opacity of assumptions, investors have limited ability to assess whether valuations reflect underlying reality or hopeful projections.
That risk deepens when NAV-based liquidity is layered on top.
Evergreen funds typically offer “quarterly liquidity,” often allowing redemptions of up to 5% of NAV per quarter, subject to gates. But that liquidity isn’t guaranteed. Private equity assets are illiquid by definition. They can’t be quickly or cleanly sold without price concessions. So how do evergreen funds meet redemptions?
They have several tools:
- Cash Buffers
Which may dampen returns - New Inflows
Which could fund redemptions, like a liquidity daisy chain - Line of Credit
Which adds interest expense to the fund - Secondary Sales
Which may require discounted sales but can be mitigated by aligning with portfolio cash flows
In stable conditions and in conjunction with realizations on existing investments—which may be episodic and are often long duration—these work. In stressed markets, they break down — redemptions rise, inflows slow, credit is constrained, secondaries trade at discounts and portfolio realizations slow down. At that point, managers must face hard choices: sell at losses, or gate redemptions.
We’ve already seen funds gate redemptions during moderate stress8 — even in asset classes with more liquidity than private equity. And because NAVs are soft, neither remaining nor redeeming investors can know whether they’re getting fair value.
Drawdown funds avoid this dynamic. They make no promises of interim liquidity — freeing managers to navigate dislocations without being forced sellers. NAVs are still estimated during the life of the fund, but they’re likely less impactful as investors aren’t entering and exiting at interim NAVs, plus fees and performance are ultimately tied to realized distributions. Reality, not optics, drives outcomes.
These are not minor differences. Evergreen structures rely on two fragile assumptions: that NAVs are timely and accurate, and that liquidity will be there when needed. History, structure, and human behavior all suggest otherwise.
Theme 4 | Apples to Oranges: Misleading Marketing Comparisons
Many evergreen funds are marketed with performance comparisons that, while technically correct, are misleading. Numerous whitepapers and pitch decks claim evergreen structures outperform traditional drawdown funds — and on the surface, the math checks out.
A common example: comparing a 10% annualized evergreen return to a 10% IRR from a drawdown fund. Since evergreen funds are fully deployed from day one, they show higher terminal values in simple models.
But this isn’t really an investment insight, it’s more like a math truism. If you let $100 compound uninterrupted for a decade while only gradually deploying that same $100 in another strategy, the former will almost always look better in a linear model. The framing ignores context — and the underlying assets.
- Evergreen funds typically maintain larger cash buffers and lean on secondaries
and liquid credit — all of which tend to yield lower returns than primary private
equity investments9 - Drawdown funds focus on primary deals, growth equity, and small buyouts —
typically higher upside - Real-world portfolios invest across drawdown vintages, reducing the impact of
assumptions that model uncalled capital as passively invested in a 60/40 portfolio
The result? A set of comparisons that imply evergreen funds are inherently more effective, when in fact they’re simply structured differently — and often designed around more conservative assets.
It is important to note, most evergreen funds are still in their early days, with only a handful having track records longer than three years. As a result, most comparisons are based on unrealized performance, and the structural risks outlined here have not yet had time to fully play out.
So, What’s the Better Approach?
This isn’t a binary debate. We don’t believe evergreen funds are inherently bad — or that drawdown funds are always better in every situation. Both structures have their place when thoughtfully designed and executed.
Evergreen funds can also serve a valuable supporting role alongside drawdown vehicles. Their continuous deployment structure helps address the timing challenges that many investors face when entering private equity. For clients still building their exposure, evergreen funds can act as a “holding pattern” — a way to stay invested while awaiting capital calls or new drawdown opportunities. Similarly, they can absorb liquidity as distributions come in, helping clients maintain their target allocation more effectively over time. When used thoughtfully, evergreen structures can provide tactical flexibility that enhances overall portfolio construction.
But for investors serious about long-term outperformance in private equity, we believe drawdown structures should remain the foundation as they:
- Can structurally target broader access to high-performing, capacity constrained
managers - Allow deeper exposure to core strategies like growth equity, small buyouts and
venture capital - Align fees more transparently with actual outcomes
- Better avoid valuation and liquidity illusions
- Encourage investor patience and thoughtful deployment
Yes, they’re less convenient. They require more education and introduce some discomfort. But those very traits are often what support outperformance. They’re potentially harder to sell, require more client education, and introduce some discomfort. But that discomfort supports many factors that are core to what makes them effective. Like a difficult workout, they yield better results because they ask more of the participant.
Private equity has never been about ease. In our view, its strength lies in selectivity, alignment, and long-term orientation — traits that don’t translate well to comfort-first design.
Evergreen funds aren’t a fad or a scam. Some are thoughtfully built, and some may perform well. But as they gain industry traction, we shouldn’t let convenience cloud critical judgment. Not everything that feels easier is actually better.
For advisors and clients aiming to build lasting wealth through private equity, discomfort isn’t a flaw — it’s a feature. And drawdown structures, with all their frictions, remain the more disciplined, aligned, and effective path forward.
- Source: Marshmallow Test Experiment In Psychology
- Source: The Comfort Crisis: Embrace Discomfort to Reclaim Your Wild, Healthy, Happy Self
- An analysis of U.S. state pension private-equity portfolios (2000–2023) found that private equity delivered an 11.0 % net annualized return compared with 6.2 % for a public-stock benchmark, providing a 4.8-percentage-point annual advantage caia.org. FS Investments also notes that private equity funds have outperformed the S&P 500 over 5-, 10-, 15- and 20-year periods fsinvestments.com.
- Source: The Potential Trade-Offs of Private Market Fund Structures: Part One
- Source: The Compelling Case for an Allocation to Semi-Liquid Evergreen Private Equity
- Research by advisory firm Campbell Lutyens found that evergreen vehicles paid 4% more last year on average for stakes in secondaries funds than traditional buyers. Ft.com
- The UK Financial Conduct Authority’s 2025 multi-firm review of private-market valuation practices found that, while some firms had sound practices, others did not adequately identify or document conflicts of interest. The FCA highlighted conflicts related to (1) fees linked to NAV; (2) asset transfers in continuation vehicles; (3) pricing redemptions and subscriptions in open-ended funds using NAV; and (4) marketing performance based on unrealized valuations. The FCA emphasised that robust valuations should be independent, transparent and consistent: skadden.com.
- Evergreen funds often promise quarterly liquidity up to a percentage of net asset value (NAV), but redemptions can be gated. Blackstone’s Real Estate Income Trust (BREIT) met a surge of redemption requests in March 2023. According to a Blue Vault summary of Reuters reporting, BREIT received about $4.5 billion of withdrawal requests but honored only $666 million (≈15 %), because its structure capped redemptions at 5 % of NAV: bluevaultpartners.com.
- FS Investments notes that evergreen managers allocate allocate a portion of capital to cash or liquid securities to ensure liquidity for investor redemptions fsinvestments.com.
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Risks
All investments risk loss of capital and there is no guarantee that an investment will achieve its investment objective. Private Fund investments in particular involve significant risks and are intended for experienced and sophisticated investors. Some of the risks associated with an investment in Private Funds include: (i) use of leverage or other speculative investment practices, (ii) illiquidity of investments including restrictions on transfers, (iii) potential multiple layers of fees and expenses, and (iv) lack of comprehensive regulatory regime. For a complete description of the risks associated with such investments please review the “Risk Factors” and “Conflicts of Interest” sections in the relevant Offering Memorandum.
Performance and Fees
Performance for the most recent time period presented may be based on estimated returns and is subject to change. Performance of individually managed accounts will vary based on constraints, timing, funding levels and other factors and may be lower or higher than any performance shown herein. Unless otherwise indicated, performance shown is net of fees and expenses incurred at the underlying fund or account level and includes the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings. Past performance may not be indicative of future results.
Hypothetical Performance
Hypothetical performance results have many inherent limitations, some of which are described below. No representation is being made that any account will or is likely to achieve gains or losses similar to those shown. In fact, there are frequently sharp differences between hypothetical performance results and the actual results subsequently achieved by any particular investment program. One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the impact of financial risk in actual trading. For example, the ability to withstand losses or to adhere to a particular trading program in spite of investment losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual results. There are numerous other factors related to the markets in general or to the implementation of any specific investment program which cannot be fully accounted for in the preparation of hypothetical performance results and all of which can adversely affect actual results.
Private Investment Performance
Portfolios invested in Private Equity, Private Real Assets, Private Opportunistic Assets, or Private Credit funds display performance for these investments once each such fund has reached its respective Performance Threshold. The Performance Threshold is defined as one year from the first capital balance for SCS Managed Private Equity and Private Credit Funds, or two years from the first capital balance for SCS Managed Private Real Assets or Private Opportunistic Assets Funds, and once total capital called has reached 33% of aggregate capital commitments. Both thresholds must also be met for 3rd party-managed Private Equity, Private Real Assets, Private Opportunistic Assets, or Private Credit funds recommended by SCS. Unless otherwise noted, Private Investment performance and market values reflect capital activity through the date of this report. The most recent performance is based on best available information and is subject to change.
Capital Call Credit Line
Most Private Investment funds managed by SCS utilize a capital call line of credit to facilitate the funding of underlying investments and reduce the number of capital calls issued to investors. Performance reported for the SCS-managed Private Investment funds includes the effects of each funds’ borrowing. The reported internal rate of return (“IRR”) may be higher than the fund would have otherwise reported without the use of borrowing due to deferral of investors’ capital calls. The reported total value to paid-in capital ratio (“TVPI”) may be temporarily higher while investments are being funded without calling capital from investors and will ultimately result in a lower TVPI than what would have been achieved without the expense of credit facility.
SCS Private Investment Recommendations
There can be no assurance that the Private Equity, Private Credit, Private Real Assets, or Private Opportunistic Assets funds recommended will achieve their investment objectives, be able to implement their investment strategies or be able to avoid losses. Despite each fund targeting a diversified portfolio of investments, an investment in the funds should be considered to be illiquid, speculative investments and, accordingly, are not intended to be a complete investment program and should be considered as part of a diversified investment portfolio. Investments in the funds are intended for investors who understand the strategy, risks, and terms of the funds, and do not require liquidity with respect to the investment and are able to bear the risk of the value of fund potentially going up or down. Additional information concerning the risks of investment and the definitive terms for each of the funds are contained in each fund’s Offering Memorandum.
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